Gambiaj.com – (BANJUL, The Gambia) – Former army commander, cabinet minister, and veteran diplomat Sheriff Samsudeen Sarr has waded into the nation’s governance debate, issuing a scathing critique of the growing nostalgia for the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) era.
In his latest essay, “The Myth of the Best Government,” the author and political analyst argues that claims portraying the PPP’s 30-year rule as the “golden age” of Gambian politics are both misleading and intellectually dishonest. Sarr contends that such assertions rely on flawed historical comparisons that ignore the global realities and limited public awareness of the time.
Managing an Inherited System
Sarr posits that when the PPP assumed power at independence in 1965, its mandate was strictly shaped by colonial architecture. He notes that Great Britain had already entrenched the constitution, judiciary, civil service, and security forces.
According to Sarr, the post-independence elite merely managed this inherited system rather than transforming it into something uniquely Gambian.
Situating Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara’s leadership within the Cold War context, Sarr explains that African leaders who pursued radical nationalist paths—such as Kwame Nkrumah or Patrice Lumumba—often faced coups or assassinations. In contrast, he argues that Jawara aligned with former colonial powers to secure international approval, effectively preserving colonial structures under African management.
‘Cosmetic’ Independence
The veteran analyst describes Gambian independence as “largely cosmetic.” While the flags and names changed, Sarr maintains the foundations of the state remained stagnant. He cites the continued reliance on colonial-era institutions as evidence of a structural continuity that has persisted across successive administrations.
Furthermore, Sarr challenges the idea that the PPP era enjoyed superior legitimacy. He attributes the era’s perceived stability to low levels of political awareness rather than genuine contentment.
“The absence of a local university, limited communication tools, and restricted access to information meant citizens lacked the capacity to challenge authority,” Sarr argues, suggesting that this historical lack of resistance is now being misinterpreted as national satisfaction.
A Cycle of Neocolonialism
Sarr does not spare subsequent regimes from his analysis. While acknowledging the infrastructure expansion under Yahya Jammeh and the democratic openness of the Adama Barrow administration, he maintains that all three governments have operated within the same “neocolonial framework.”
He points to the 1981 attempted coup—which required Senegalese military intervention to suppress—and the eventual 1994 takeover as proof of the inherent fragility of the PPP’s “stability.”
Sarr concludes that debating which government was “best” is a distraction from the country’s more urgent task: confronting the unfinished project of decolonization. He calls for the building of a new political and economic order rooted in Gambian realities rather than colonial shadows.
